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Abstract
     Money is the prime incentive in economic models. Recent 
evidence makes it clear that people are also greatly concerned 
about  how their  incomes  compare  with  those  of others, 
suggesting that rank may be a strong motivator as well. Three 
experiments  in  Vietnam  assessed whether  students  in  real-
world  learning  environments  were  concerned  with  their 
performance rankings. The results showed that concern with 
rank, even when rankings were not publicly revealed, strongly 
motivated  performance  on  academic  tests.  Moreover,  rank 
was able to outweigh money as a motivator.
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Introduction
Assume that you have a choice of living in one of the following two worlds. In the 
first, you earn $50,000 a year and your peers earn half that. In the second, you earn $100,000
a year and your peers earn more than double that. Assume that prices are the same in both 
situations. Which world would you prefer? If you are self-interested and do not care about 
the incomes of others, the choice is easy: the second world. The choice would be the same 
even if you are altruistic.  However, when faced with this choice, the majority of the subjects 
in Solnick and Hemenway’s 1998 experiment opted for the first world. This choice suggests 
a strong human desire for achieving  high economic position relative to others. Yet this
preference has received little attention in economics. Arguably, this preference emerged only 
in  the  context  of a  questionnaire.  The  experiments  described  here  tested  whether  that 
preference would  still  be observed  when real  effort and  real  resources  were  at  stake  in 
achieving rank. 
High rank often comes with tangible benefits. Students with higher rank on the SAT
get  admitted  to  better  colleges;  employees  with higher  rankings on  performance  get
promoted faster; individuals ranked higher socially get more attention from the opposite sex.
Therefore, it is not surprising that people prefer having high rank in such cases. But are
individuals willing to sacrifice by effort or expenditure in order to achieve high rank even if 
there aren’t such tangible benefits?
Biological research has shown that high rank is often associated with concentrations 
of serotonin, a neurotransmitter in the brain. Moderate concentrations of serotonin enhance
feelings of well-being (Madsen 1994). This rewarding association, which could be the result 
of natural selection or of Pavlovian conditioning, hints at an inherent drive for high rank in 3
humans and in other social animals. If this is true, we should see people competing for rank 
even when rank does not bring tangible rewards.
In traditional economics, only an individual’s own payoffs enter his utility function.
Rank is not part of the standard neoclassical economic model. Indeed, rank is not even 
mentioned in most contemporary microeconomics texts. Yet, economists have long noted 
that the desire for rank, e.g., in wealth or status, is a major motivator.
1 There is a significant 
literature – Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) is perhaps the best known example –
in which payoffs to others depress one’s utility. 
Recently there have been serious efforts to extend economic modeling to account 
for status  goods,  relative  positions and the  rank  incentive.
2 This  renewed interest  was 
motivated partly by the growing empirical evidence in the literature of subjective well-being. 
Econometric analyses have consistently shown that the higher incomes of their peers lead 
people to report lower happiness (Luttmer, 2005). Despite these observational studies, many 
traditional  economists  still  prefer  to  see  direct  behavioral  evidence,  especially  from 
controlled experiments.
To date, the behavioral evidence for rank as an incentive has been sparse. Even 
though people may say that they prefer high rank, this preference is hard to demonstrate 
behaviorally in the lab or in the field for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult to separate 
the motivation of a high absolute payoff from that of a high rank, as a high payoff often 
leads to a high rank, and vice versa. Second, even when high rank is not connected to a high 
                                                
1 For  examples,  see  Adam  Smith  (1759),  Veblen  (1899),  Arthur  Pigou  (1920),  Fred  Hirsch  (1976) and 
Duesenberry (1949).
2 A few examples include Frank (1985, 1991, 2005 and 2007), Ng (1987), Congleton (1989), Ireland’s (1994, 
1998  and  2001),  Pesendorfer’s  (1995),  Bagwell  and  Bernheim’s  (1996),  Piccione  and  Rubinstein’s  (2004), 
Heffetz, 2004, and Rayo and Becker (2007)4
absolute payoff, it is difficult to show that people will sacrifice some absolute payoff in 
exchange for high rank in an experiment.
These difficulties leave untested three key hypotheses about rank incentive. They are: 
Hypothesis 1: Rank motivates people to improve their performance in their customary
activities; 
Hypothesis 2: Rank motivates people even when it does not bring tangible benefits; 
and 
Hypothesis  3: People  are  willing  to  sacrifice  financial rewards  to  improve  their 
rankings.
We  present a  series of experiments  conducted  in  Vietnamese  universities to test
these three hypotheses. These experiments differed from most experiments in economics in 
the  sense  that  they  were  embedded in  a  social  context  (such  as  a  classroom)  to  allow 
performance rank to exhibit its actual power. We assessed how strongly subjects cared about
their performance rank relative to that of others. We evaluated this strength by measuring
the extent to which individuals improve their performance when rank was included as an 
additional consideration.  This told us about the power of rank as an incentive.
Experiment 1 separated the rank incentive from any money incentive, and tested
whether rankings motivate people to improve their performance (Hypothesis 1). We gave a 
class of college students some reading material to prepare for a test that would be given in 
ten days. Each student received a participation fee. We randomly assigned the students into 
one  control group (with no extra  incentive)  and three  treatment  groups  (one with  rank 
incentive, one with financial incentive and one with both). We found that: (i) the group that 
knew that their rankings would be publicized outperformed the control group; (ii) the group 
that both earned cash for correct answers and knew that their rankings would be publicized 5
outperformed the group that merely earned cash for correct answers. This results support 
Hypothesis 1.
Experiment 2 was a field experiment designed to test whether rank motivates people 
even when not associated with tangible benefits (Hypothesis 2). We conducted biweekly
tests for students who were enrolled in a regular 4-month English course. The students 
received their scores privately after each test. With respect to rankings on the tests, students
were randomly divided into an unranked control group and two treatment groups that would 
be informed about their rankings either privately or publicly. At the end of the English 
course, the students took the Official TOEIC Test. Both treatment groups outperformed 
the control group on this test. Divulging rank privately gave the students no tangible benefits
but did motivate them to increase their performance from the 49.5
th to the 59.5
th percentile 
of all  TOEIC-takers  around  the  world. This  impressive  improvement  strongly supports 
Hypothesis 2.
Experiment 3 aimed to test whether people care enough about rank that they will 
sacrifice significant financial rewards to achieve it (Hypothesis 3). We asked MBA students at 
a business school to participate in a business knowledge exercise. The exercise required each 
student to run a hypothetical firm, create revenue for that firm and earn an actual personal 
cash reward based on success. Students were informed that their rankings, as based on their 
firm’s revenues, would  be  announced  at  the  end  of  the  exercise.  Near  the  end  of  the 
exercise, the students were offered the opportunity to exchange confidentially their cash 
rewards for higher revenue rankings. As a result, 39 out of 43 students spent their own 
money to improve their publicized scores and thereby get higher rankings. On average, the 
students  spent  65,800  Vietnamese  dongs,  an  amount  that  could  have  bought them  5-6 6
lunches. This amount was about 2/3 of the average cash reward. Ten students spent their 
entire reward.
The key feature in the design of these three experiments was that subjects knew one 
another socially, much as we know our neighbors or colleagues.  This design simulated real 
life and allowed rank as an incentive to exhibit its large influence. All three experiments were 
conducted at universities in Vietnam.  There, openly publicized grades are the standard way 
of informing students of their performance.  This choice of location made it easy to recruit 
volunteer participants.
3  
Related Literatures
Evidence from the life sciences. Ranking, which leads to a dominance hierarchy,
plays a critical role in the animal kingdom. It has been studied extensively. Dominant or 
high-ranked animals have been shown to have better access to food resources (Baker et al. 
1981, Poysa 1988, Hogstad 1989) and to locations safer from predators (Schneider 1984, 
Hegner 1985, Hogstad 1989). Higher ranked animals also enjoy greater reproductive success 
than subordinates, who are less likely to win contests for mates (Hausfater 1975; Le Boeuf 
and Reiter 1988). In cooperatively breeding species, dominant individuals can monopolize 
reproduction almost completely (birds: Brown, 1987, mammals: Solomon and French, 1996, 
insects: Keller and Reeve, 1994). 
Furthermore, the desire to have high rank may be driven not only by the pleasures 
from food or mating, but also by the intrinsic enjoyment of being high-ranked. Serotonin is a 
neurotransmitter that brings a feeling of well-being. One primate study showed that when a 
                                                
3 The ratios of participants to invited students in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 were 91, 100 and 88%, respectively.7
male monkey was experimentally made to be the dominant monkey in his pack his serotonin 
level  rose,  and  vice  versa  when  he  was  removed (Raleigh et  al., 1991). Individuals  that 
intrinsically enjoy high rank tend to work harder to achieve it than individuals that do not
enjoy it. They also have a better chance of survival and of producing more offspring. The 
intrinsic pleasure associated with high rank may thus be a result of the natural selection 
process.
For humans, similar experimental data has not been available, and the relationship of 
serotonin to rank is less clearly established. However, elevated serotonin levels have been 
found in the leaders of college  fraternities and of athletic teams.
4 A positive correlation 
between serotonin level and social rank has also been found among male college students in 
general (Madsen 1994). The positive relationship between  rank and  the level of the sex
hormone testosterone has also been observed (Mazur and Lamb 1980, Elias 1981, Mazur 
1983). The causality of these relationships has not been established, because doing so would 
require unacceptable experiments on humans.
Primates living in complex dominance hierarchies tend to have greater neocortical 
development than other primates. In order to survive in hierarchy, an individual needs to 
develop the mental capacity to discriminate rankings and rules, and to decide when to engage
in activities that might allow one to move up in rank. This mental ability might have left an 
indelible  mark  on the  architecture  of primate  reasoning,  climaxing  in  the  human brain
(Cummins 1996).
Theoretical works in economics.  In the economics literature, the concern for relative 
position first received serious discussion by Thorstein Veblen in his 1899 classic The Theory of 
                                                
4 In communication between Frank and McGuire (Frank, 1999)8
the Leisure Class. He coined the term conspicuous consumption, regarding it as a wasteful spending
of resources to demonstrate status over others. Veblen’s work has long been noted, but it 
never became part of the economics canon, particularly since individualistic utility became a 
dominant concept in the field.
5
Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2007) argued for the evolutionary emergence 
of rank incentives. They proposed and formalized the argument that nature promotes the 
thriving and reproduction of individuals who strive to outrank their peers on the social scales
of wealth and status, since higher rankings allows for greater reproductive success. 
Empirical evidence from the happiness literature. Empirical studies on the effects of 
social rankings have been most fruitful in the area of subjective well-being. These studies
have yielded several observations about the relationship between income and happiness. The 
first finding is consistent with the standard economics model: within a society at any point in 
time, richer people tend to report higher happiness than poor people. Easterlin (1995, 2001) 
and Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) showed this result for the United States. Di Tella, 
MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001) showed this same result for a number of Western European 
societies.
The  second  finding, however, seems  inconsistent  with  the  standard economics 
model: over the long term, the average happiness of a society does increase little despite 
large increases in average income. This observation was made early by Easterlin (1974) for 
                                                
5 The “Veblen effect” is discussed further in the work of Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950), and Hirsch 
(1976), but it gets little attention in leading economics texts. The recent interest in conspicuous consumption 
was reignited by Frank (1985a and 1985b), then further advanced by Ng (1987), Congleton (1989), Braun and 
Wicklund  (1989),  Creedy  and  Slottie  (1991),  Pesendorfer  (1995),  Frank  and  Cook  (1996),  Bagwell  and 
Bernheim (1996), Frank (1999), Piccione and Rubinsteins (2004) and Heffetz (2004).9
the United States, and was recently supported by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), Diener 
and Oishi (2000), Myers (2000), Kenny (1999) and Lane (1998) for other western countries.
6
A general interpretation reconciles both findings: Income-related happiness depends 
primarily  or  exclusively  on  relative  income  (or  consumption):  as  everybody’s  income 
increases,  the  average  happiness  will  therefore not  increase. Some  empirical research 
supported this  interpretation more  directly.  Using  panel  data  from the  United  States,
Luttmer (2005) rigorously showed a negative association between neighbors’ income and the 
individuals’ self-reported happiness (and other measures of well-being.) This association was 
stronger for people who socialized more with their neighbors, indicating that indeed relative 
income strongly affected happiness.
Behavioral  evidence  from  the  economics  literature.  Unfortunately,  there  is  little 
direct behavioral evidence for rank as an incentive. However, some survey and experimental
evidence indicates that concerns about rank affect behavior. Using survey data, Rizzo and 
Zeckhauser (2005) showed that young male physicians who thought that their incomes were 
below  the  “adequate  income” in  the  profession secured greater income  increases in  the 
subsequent period than those who thought that their incomes were adequate or better.
7 In 
experiments  designed  by Guth  and  Tietz  (1990), Roth  (1995)  and Camerer  and  Thaler 
(1995),  many  subjects  preferred receiving nothing  to  an  inequitable  outcome.  Gneezy, 
Niederle and Rustichini (2003) showed that with ranks known in mixed-gender competition 
                                                
6 Wolfers  and  Stevenson  (2008)  debated  this  observation  and  argued  that  there  is  a  clear  link  between 
happiness and economic growth.
7Interestingly, these authors do not find that female physicians responded to their reference income. They 
showed that the gender difference in setting the “adequate income” and responding to it accounted fully for 
the gender difference in income.  Our Experiments 1 and 3, by contrast, which did find significant rank effects, 
were conducted with a predominantly female group of subjects.  10
men improved their performance but not women, and that in single-gender competition 
both men and women improved their performance.
Evidence from the psychological literature. Psychologists are more interested in how 
competition affects motivation than how it affect performance. They differentiate between 
intrinsic  and  extrinsic  motivations.
8 Competition  for  high  rankings is  categorized  as  an
extrinsic  motivation. A  meta  study  by  Rawsthorne  and  Elliot  (1999), reviewing 23 
psychological studies, found that extrinsic motivation tends to undermine students’ intrinsic 
motivation. Having to compete for a performance goal such as a high class ranking actually 
lowers the interest in and pleasure from doing an activity. Among these 23 studies, only 
Butler and Nisan (1986) reported the effect of performance goals on performance. They 
showed that the students who expected a grade in doing an exercise performed better than 
the students who did not.
Lam, Yim, Law and Cheung (2004) ran a test for rank as an incentive in a typing 
course for Hong Kong students. The students were told that there would be a test at the end 
of the course and that each student would receive a certificate. Some students were told that 
they would receive the certificates with their class rankings; others without rankings.  They 
found that the students who expected rankings performed significantly better on the easy 
items but not on the difficult items.
9
Butler and Kedar (1990) asked 16 groups of fourth-grade Israeli students to do a 
word game. Among them, 8 groups were put in a separate room and told to compete with 
                                                
8 Intrinsic motivation refers to internal stimuli such as the meanings, emotions or pleasure associated with an 
activity. Extrinsic motivation refers to external stimuli such as payments, acknowledgement, or punishment.
9 There was a design issue in  this experiment because the students  were told that they could choose  the 
difficulty level of the final test.11
each other to achieve the highest score. The competing groups performed 25% higher than 
non-competing groups.  These  findings  indicate that  students  who  expect  to  be  ranked 
perform better.
Experiment 1 – Effects of the Incentives of Rank and Cash
Our  first experiment  sought to  determine  whether  rankings motivate  people  to 
improve their performance (Hypothesis 1).  To do so, we asked subjects to perform a task 
with and without a rank incentive, and with or without a cash incentive for each correct 
answer. The  experiment  was conducted  with  a  second-year  undergraduate  class  at  the 
Faculty of Sociology, the National University for Social Sciences and Humanities in Hanoi. 
The students in this class knew each other well, as they had been taking courses together for 
almost two years and expected to continue doing so for two more years. 
Design and conduct. 75 students (11 male and 64 female) were given a book with
100 IQ-style problems with answers. They were informed that in 10 days they would be 
given a test of 80 questions chosen from that list. Since the students had the answers in 
advance, they could improve their scores significantly by studying the book before the test.
Students were randomly assigned to one of four groups and informed of their group’s score-
announcing method and cash reward, as shown below:  
Score informing
method
Performance-
-based cash reward
Privately to only 
the student
Publicly 
in the class
No Group 1-BASE
(18 students)
Group 1-PUBLIC
(18 students)
500 dongs/ correct answer Group 1-CASH
(20 students)
Group 1-
PUBLIC&CASH
(19 students)12
The expectation of public announcement of the scores made rankings salient and 
provided a rank incentive. The students were also informed that they would receive a fixed 
participation fee. The participation fee for each student in group 1-BASE and 1-PUBLIC
was  60,000  dongs. The  participation  fee  for  each  student  in  group  1-CASH and  1-
PUBLIC&CASH was 40,000 dongs in order to make all the students’ earnings roughly equal,
as the two latter groups were expected to earn additional cash during the experiment.
10
Results
The average scores of Group 1-BASE, 1-PUBLIC, 1-CASH and 1-PUBLIC&CASH
were respectively 11.3, 18.1, 14.5 and 19.6 correct answers out of 80 questions (Figure 1).
11
Group  1-PUBLIC outperformed  Group  1-BASE by  60%.  Group  1-PUBLIC&CASH
outperformed Group 1-CASH by 36% (The standard deviation among students was 10.3
correct  answers.) These  differences  across  groups  were  statistically  significant,  and 
demonstrated that the students were motivated to achieve high rankings. Table 2 provides
the statistics of a non-parametric Wilcoxon sum-rank test for these results.
Regarding  the  cash  incentive,  Group  1-CASH outperformed  Group  1-BASE by 
28%. Group 1-PUBLIC&CASH outperformed Group 1-PUBLIC by 8%. These differences 
have the expected signs but neither is statistically significant (Table 2).
As an additional test of the above results, we ran two separate regressions on the test 
scores. The first regression was on forms of incentive; the second included the interaction 
term between the two forms of incentive. The students’ gender, age and average grades in 
                                                
10 40,000 dongs was equivalent to 2.5 dollars, which could buy about 4 lunches in unsubsidized local eateries.
11 The scores are low because answering 80 difficult questions within 45 minutes was too much for the students 
who had not studied the material beforehand. This was a specific design to separate out the students who had
prepared for the test from those who had not.13
the previous semester are used as controls. As shown in Table 3, gender and age did not 
seem to affect the scores.
12 The average grades did affect the scores in the expected way: 
students who had performed well in previous class exams also did well on this test. The 
effect of rankings was significant in all three regressions.
It  was  not  clear  from  this  analysis  whether  rank  incentive had motivated  these 
students to spend more effort preparing for or more effort taking the test, or both. In a 
post-experiment survey, we asked students about the time they had spent to prepare for the 
test. Indeed, Group 1-PUBLIC had spent more time than Group 1-BASE; and Group 1-
PUBLIC&CASH had spent more time than Group 1-CASH. The median preparation times
for each group are shown in Figure 2. The pattern in this figure suggests that the rank 
incentive motivated the students to spend more time preparing for the test. This result does 
not eliminate the possibly complementary effect that the rank incentive also motivated the 
students to work more effectively during this test.
The  results of  Experiment  1  are  impressive  given that open  announcement  was 
already the standard way of informing students their exam grades in this university, and 
throughout  Vietnam.  In  fact,  in  one  visit  to  the  class,  we  witnessed  the  class-monitor
announcing students’ grades on a previous exam loudly to the whole class. These students 
had already had many other opportunities to signal their abilities to their classmates, but the 
rank incentive still significantly improved their performance in this experiment.
These results provide behavioral evidence that people try to achieve high rank when 
their rankings will be known by others. However, whether our response to the rank incentive
is genetically encoded or educationally induced, is it possible that we enjoy high rank even 
                                                
12 One reason might be that there was limited gender and age variation in this class.14
when our rankings are not known by others? This open question was addressed in the next 
experiment.
Experiment 2 –Rank as an Incentive in a Field Experiment
This  second  experiment  extended the  above  results into  a  field  experiment, and 
tested whether individuals would be motivated by rank even when rank brought no tangible 
benefits  (Hypothesis  2).  To  do  that,  we  incorporated our  experiment  into the  English-
teaching curriculum of Hanoi’s Foreign Trade University. 
Design and conduct. Students enrolled in a regular English course at the university 
were invited to participate in an English-testing experiment in which they could receive free 
biweekly English  tests, study materials, and coaching  classes. Participating students were
informed that they would be notified of their test scores privately by phone. Regarding 
individual rankings in the tests, students were randomly assigned into 3 groups: i) Group 1 
would not be ranked; ii) Group 2 would be notified only privately by phone of their own 
rankings; iii) In addition to the private phone notification, the rankings of Group 3 would be
made public on the university’s notice-board and website.
Inform scores  Inform rankings
privately privately publicly
Group 2-BASE 
Group 2-PRIVATE  
Group 2-PUBLIC  15
At the start of the course, the participants took a baseline TOEIC-formatted test at
an ETS-authorized testing center.
13 During the one-semester-long course, they took eight 
biweekly tests. At the end of the course, participating students could choose to take an 
Official TOEIC at a subsidized fee. If they took this final test, they would receive Official 
TOEIC Certificates, which would be helpful to them in finding jobs after their graduation 
the following year.
In Vietnamese society today, English is a rewarding skill, as it provides access to 
high-paying jobs and overseas educations.
14 TOEIC is a popular test designed specifically to 
measure English communication skills; it is commonly used by businesses to evaluate the 
English  language skills  of  job  candidates.  The  students  in  Experiment  2  were  already 
spending time to prepare for and to take this valuable test. We sought to determine whether
a rank incentive would motivate them even further.
Given the marketable value of English skill and the demonstrated commitment of 
the students, the experiment’s participation and completion rates were extremely high, as 
expected. All 125 undergraduate students who enrolled in the English course volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. These students had taken other courses together for the past 
three years and knew each other relatively well. Most of them were 21 years old.  There were 
98 female and 27 male participants, reflecting the predominance of female students at the 
university. The students were  allowed  to skip some of the  eight biweekly tests, but the 
participation rate in these tests remained high (87%). Only one student dropped out of the 
                                                
13 Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) is a test administered by the Educational Testing 
Service USA (ETS), which also administers the TOEFL.
14  Vietnam’s economy for the past 20 years has integrated quickly with the world’s. According to the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam, in 2005 the ratio of foreign direct investment, exports and imports over GDP 
were 48, 62 and 70% respectively. This integration has been creating many jobs that require English skills and 
an overseas education.16
experiment, for a personal reason. All the remaining 124 students chose to take the Official
TOEIC at the end of the course.
Results
This  experiment showed that  the  rank  incentive exerted  a  large  effect,  whether 
rankings were  made  known  publicly  or  only  privately.  On  the  initial test to  establish  a 
baseline, there were no significant differences among the three randomized groups. Four
months later, on the final test, the average scores of groups 2-BASE, 2-PRIVATE and 2-
PUBLIC were 604, 656 and 680 points respectively (Figure 3). The group that knew that 
their rankings would be known to others - Group 2-PUBLIC - earned 76 points more than 
the control group - Group 2-BASE. The group that learned of their rankings privately -
Group 2-PRIVATE – earned 52 points more than Group 2-BASE. These differences were 
statistically  and  practically  significant.
15 Expressed  in  different  terms,  starting  from  an 
equivalent base, the improvement gains were 81 points for Group 2-BASE, 133 for Group 
2-PRIVATE, and 155 for Group 2-PUBLIC, thus 64% greater than Group 2-BASE for 
Group 2-PRIVATE, and 91% greater than Group 2-BASE for Group 2-PUBLIC.
Such  disparities  in improvement  in  TOEIC  scores within  four months  are  very 
substantial. Compared to scores of all TOEIC-takers around the world from 2005 to 2007, 
the Group 2-BASE students scored at the 49.5th percentile.  By contrast, students receiving 
private notice of their rankings scored at 59.5th percentile, and those receiving publicized 
rankings scored at 64th percentile.
We ran a regression of the final TOEIC scores on group membership (Table 4). In 
all regression specifications, the rank incentive significantly bolstered test scores. In these 
                                                
15 The difference between the privately and publicly ranked groups went in the expected direction, but was not 
significant.17
regressions, we sequentially controlled for initial scores, gender, classroom effects, average 
grades in other courses. As expected, final test scores strongly correlated with initial test 
scores and average grades in other courses.
16 A one-point increase in the initial test score of a 
student was associated with an approximately one-point increase in the final test score of 
that  student.  A one-unit  increase  in  the  student’s  average  grade  in  other  courses  was
associated with a 112.6-point increase in the final test score (this massive multiple arises
because grades were on a 10-point scale, and the test scores were on a 990-point scale.)
Gender showed an insignificant effect possibly because there were too few male participants 
in the sample. Two classes showed significant effects, probably due to the quality of their
teachers.
17
To see whether rank incentive motivates more study efforts or better test-taking 
effectiveness, we asked the students midway through the course how much time they had 
spent to study English during the previous seven days. The average study times of Group 2-
PRIVATE and  2-PUBLIC were  the  same  (4  hours, 45  minutes).  These  values were 
significantly higher than that of Group 2-BASE (3 hours, 46 minutes). It appears that the 
rank incentives motivated these students to work longer (reported) hours.
These analyses confirm the key finding in this experiment: there is clear evidence that 
people try to achieve high rankings even when their rankings will not be known to others. 
                                                
16 The effect of rank incentive is somewhat reduced after controlling for average grades. This indicates that by 
chance the ranked groups had higher average grades than the unranked group.
17 The experiment was conducted simultaneously in four classes, which had between 27 and 34 students each. 
The group randomization was conducted within each class.18
Also, there is suggestive but not conclusive evidence  that public knowledge of rankings
provides additional motivation.
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Experiment 3 – Willingness to Pay for Rank
The previous two experiments demonstrated that the desire for a higher rank can 
induce people to perform better. But are people willing to spend money to achieve a higher 
rank? Experiment 3 addressed this third hypothesis.
Design and conduct. 43 (14 male and 29 female) MBA students at the Hanoi School 
of Business were invited to and participated in a business knowledge exercise in which they 
could win cash bonuses and letters confirming their participation.
19 In this game, they were
“hired” as an executive of a hypothetical trading firm whose revenues depended on their 
business knowledge. The students were informed that their rankings, as determined by their 
firms’ revenues, would be announced at the end of the exercise.
The exercise had two rounds:
Round 1:  Without prior preparation, students had 30 minutes to respond to 100 
multiple-choice  questions  about  various  aspects  of  business (management,  finance, 
accounting and marketing).
20 Each student was informed that each correct answer increased 
                                                
18 This “extrinsic rank incentive” created another 3.9% score improvement, which is significant in the one-
tailed test at 86% confidence level.
19 Most invited students participated. Only 6 students in this MBA class did not participate because they were 
not available at the time of the experiment. Being in the same class, these students had known each other for at 
least one year.
20 Responding to 100 difficult questions in 30 minutes was a very challenging task. This design had 2 purposes. 
First, it made the students suppose that whoever performed well in this game must have extensive business 
knowledge and judgment. Second, it reduced the ability difference between high- and low-performing groups as 19
the revenue of that student’s firm by 1,000,000 dongs, and earned that student a personal
cash bonus of 3,000 dongs.
Round 2: This round took place a few days after Round 1 and had two parts. In Part 
2-a, the students were informed privately of their performance in Round 1, i.e., how many 
correct answers they had given, the current revenues of their firm, their personal cash bonus, 
and whether they currently belonged in the top, 2
nd, 3
rd or bottom quartile of the class 
rankings. The students were informed that only their rankings based on each firm’s total 
revenues in  the  two  rounds  would  be  announced  at  the  end  of  the  exercise.  All  other 
information about the students’ answers and choices in the two rounds, as well as, about 
their cash bonuses would be kept strictly private. 
In Part 2-b, each student was asked to deal with a demanding client who was willing 
to purchase large amounts from the student’s firm but at a deep discount. The students 
could not earn any personal cash bonuses in this round. Furthermore, if they wanted to sell 
to this client, they had to spend some of the cash bonuses they had already won during
Round 1 to cover this client’s discount. For every 3,000 dongs the students spent out of their
cash  bonuses,  they could  increase  their firms’  revenues by  1,000,000  dongs,  and  thus 
improve  their  own final  class  rank.    The  students were  asked  how  much  of  their  cash 
bonuses they were willing to spend in order to make such a deal with this client and thereby 
improve their firms’ revenues and rankings. This was essentially a decision about whether to
exchange their confidential cash bonuses for their publicized class rankings. If they did not 
care about rankings, they should not spend any money to achieve higher rankings.
                                                                                                                                                
the students had to guess at the answers to most questions.  In fact, the mean score was 22/100 correct 
answers – close to random guessing. Many students score around this mean. (The coefficient of variation of the 
score distribution was 35.7%.)20
Also, at the beginning of Round 2, we announced that a minimum cash bonus level 
of 99,000 dongs would be provided for Round 1. The 40 out of 43 students who earned less 
than 99,000 dongs thereby received an automatic raise to 99,000 dongs. This design made 
almost everyone start with the same budget when entering Round 2 despite their different 
scores in Round 1.  
Results. In Round 2, 39 out of 43 students spent money to boost their rankings. 10 
of them spent the entire cash bonuses that they had earned. The average spending was 
65,800 dongs, which was about 2/3 of the average cash bonus from Round 1. (The t-statistic 
in the t-test is 13.5, indicating this spending is overwhelmingly statistically significant.) These
students were willing to pay a very large amount to improve their rankings. The average 
expenditure  was sufficient  to  have  purchased 5 or  6  lunches  for  these  students  in 
unsubsidized local eateries. In reality, rank incentive is probably stronger than shown in this 
experiment, which merely involved a game with monetary rewards that everyone knew could 
be used to purchase a boost in rank.
Figure 4 shows the average spending of the 4 quartile groups according to their 
performance  in  Round  1.  The  1
st and 3
rd quartile  groups  spent  the  most, although  the 
differences among groups were not statistically significant. We speculate that the midpoint of 
the distribution is meaningful, i.e., that it is important to fare better than the average, and 
that being at the top is meaningful, which explains behavior of the 1
st quartile. But further 
speculation about the specific importance of rank over various intervals goes beyond what 
our limited data can explain. 21
Conclusions
Our experiments show that rank incentives significantly enhanced students’ efforts
and performance in educational settings in Vietnam. We structured these experiments to 
conform to real life situations, in which people often work to earn income and status at the 
same time. In real life, people sometimes face a choice between money and status, as with 
decisions to spend money on status goods. These experiments separated these two normally
entwined incentives, and Experiment 3 measured the tradeoffs between them.
There is a legitimate concern about whether these results would be found in other 
cultures.  These  three  experiments  were  conducted  in  Vietnam,  an  Asian  country  where 
tradition  emphasizes  the  avoidance  of  “losing  face”  in  public,  and  where  educational 
attainment is strongly valued. However, there is a countervailing factor. Publicized grades are 
the standard way of announcing students’ performances in Vietnam. Thus, participants in 
these  experiments  had  other  ways  to  signal  their  ability.  If  these  experiments  had  been
conducted in another place where publicizing grades was not standard, the observed effect 
of rank incentive might have been even stronger. As mentioned in our literature review, rank 
incentives  have  been  demonstrated  to  be  strong  motivators  among  Chinese  and  Israeli 
students. Future research should explore their impact across different cultures. 
Narrowly speaking, the first and second experiments in this paper demonstrate that 
rank incentives can improve the performance of all: individuals work harder, gain more 
knowledge  and  collectively  perform  better.  Whether  such  an  outcome  is  net  beneficial 
depends on the cost of the work, and the utility gained or lost by making rankings known. 
The third experiment shows the rat-race, negative-sum potential of rank incentives. 
Students spent most of their significant cash earnings, but gained no real benefit equivalent 22
to the learning of English; and their rankings on average could not improve. Those who 
decry  conspicuous consumption identify  an  equivalent process. People  spend money  on
status goods to signal their wealth and ability, but if all do so, there is greater expenditure but 
no net gain in rank.
21
Economists  admire  competition  because  it  promotes  efficiency  and  enables  the 
market  system  to  work  efficiently.  Rank  incentives  may  be  net  beneficial  in  some 
circumstances, as they encourage all to perform better. They may be detrimental in others. 
But whatever the net report card, the record is clear. Humans care considerably about their 
rank, and economic models that seek descriptive relevance must attend to that incentive.
22
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Appendices
Table 1. Three Experiments on Rank Incentive
Experiment Hypothesis to be tested Location Subjects
Experiment 1 Rankings motivate people to 
improve their performance.
Hanoi 
National 
University
75 sociology 
undergraduates
Experiment 2 Rankings motivate people even 
when they do not bring tangible 
benefits.
Hanoi Foreign 
Trade 
University
124 foreign 
trade 
undergraduates
Experiment 3 People are willing to sacrifice 
meaningful financial rewards to 
improve their rank.
Hanoi School 
of Business  43 MBAs30
Figure 1. Monetary and Rank Incentives in Experiment 1
Table 2. Group performance comparison
Group
Comparison
Ratio of increase
in average grades
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test
PUBLIC/BASE 1.60 Z = 2.06
PUBLIC&CASH/BASE 1.36 Z = 2.29
CASH/BASE 1.28 Z = 0.54
PUBLIC&CASH/PUBLIC 1.08 Z = 0.64
Note: The Wilcoxon rank-sum test compares the absolute test scores across groups.31
Table 3: Test Scores, Incentives and Students’ Characteristics in Experiment 1
Variable (1) (2)
Public
5.61**
(2.27)
6.03*
(3.30)
Cash incentive
2.24
(2.27)
2.63
(3.20)
Male
-1.61
(3.50)
-1.66
(3.54)
Age
0.45
(0.91)
0.44
(0.91)
Average grade
3.65**
(1.57)
3.62**
(1.59)
Cash x Public
-0.81
(4.57)
Note: *   significant in a two-tailed test at 90% confidence level
** significant in a two-tailed test at 95% confidence level
- In Model (1), Group BASE is omitted.
- Public means that the student knew his/her score would be made public in class.
- Cash incentive means that the student knew s/he would receive a cash payment for 
each correct answer.
- Average grade is the student’s average grade in the prior semester’s exams.
- Standard errors are in brackets.32
Figure 2. Preparation Time Differences among Groups in Experiment 133
Figure 3. Group Average Scores in the First and Final Tests in Experiment 234
Table 4: The Effect of Group Membership on Test Scores in Experiment 2
Dependent variable is score on the final TOEIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group 2-PRIVATE 52.36* 51.55*** 49.88*** 50.07*** 24.65*
(33.93) (20.53) (20.37) (20.21) (17.85)
Group 2-PUBLIC 76.19** 73.75*** 72.47*** 72.34*** 46.08**
(34.73) (21.80) (21.30) (21.20) (20.59)
Score on first TOEIC 1.038*** 1.027*** 1.031*** 0.866***
(0.0728) (0.0738) (0.0792) (0.0756)
Male -25.68 -26.73 16.22
(22.11) (22.87) (22.27)
Class 1 31.60 50.39**
(25.30) (22.23)
Class 2 20.77 24.96
(24.26) (22.04)
Class 3 19.14 53.21***
(21.61) (18.73)
Average Grade 112.6***
(22.68)
Constant 604.1*** 61.50* 73.72** 54.41* -776.0***
(23.66) (38.37) (39.03) (42.10) (176.6)
Observations 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.040 0.648 0.653 0.658 0.727
Note: *   significant in the one-tailed test at 90% confidence level
** significant in the one-tailed test at 95% confidence level
- Average grade is the student’s average grade in the prior semester’s exams.
- Average grade is the average grade of the student in other courses.
- Class # indicates to which of four classes the student belongs.  Class 4 omitted.
Note that students in each class were randomly divided into 3 experimental groups.
- Score in the first test is the score in the baseline experiment before the experiment 
started.
- Standard errors are in brackets.35
Figure 4. Amounts Spent to Improve Rankings
Note: The average bonus available to spend was 100,500 dongs.